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In the SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DIANE FAVAT ELLA, by and through
her Guardian Ad Litem, FELIX E .
.B'AVATELLA
' Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs. .J.bJAN W. POULSEN and
MARY ELLEN CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

10264

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
srrATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued defendants for injuries resulting from
a collision between the automobiles driven by the two
defendants which collision occurred at an intersection.
Plaintiff was a passenger in the automobile being driven
by Mary Ellen Carter.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Stewart M. Hanson denied the Appellants
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at the time of pre-trial
and from said order this appeal is prosecuted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the order of the Pre-trial
Court reversed and a dismissal of plaintiff's action
against the appellant, Mary Ellen Carter, ordered.
STATEMENT OF FkCT'S
Plaintiff, a 7 year old minor child, was a passenger
in an automobile being driven by appellant, Mary Ellen
Carter, who was a teacher at St. Ann's School. The child
was a student at St. Ann's School. (See appellant's petition for interlocutory appeal.) The arrangement for
transportation of the minor child was made by her parents. No payment by the parents or the minor child to
the appellant was made for the ride.
No social relationship existed between the minor
child and the appellant and the ride arises out of the
fact that the relationship of teacher and pupil exists.
The collision occurred on the 7th of December, 1963,
at the intersection of Wilmington Avenue and 5th East
Street in Salt Lake City and plaintiff claims that the
collision occurred as the result of the negligence of the
drivers of both automobiles.
As a result of the collision the plaintiff suffered
serious and permanent injuries.

3
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II
A MINOR CHILD OF THE AGE OF 7 YEARS CANNOT
BE HELD TO BE A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW.

It is the position that a teacher hauling a student to
her school is not doing so for the pleasure of the student's company especially when the student is a 7 year
old child.

In the absence of a statutory enactment, the general
rule in the United States is that a person operating or
responsible for the operation of an automobile must use
ordinary care for the safety of guests therein and is
liable for any injuries proximately caused by negligence
in the operation of the vehicle. Godfrey v. Brown, 220
Cal. 57, 29 P.2d. 165; Shapiro v. Bookspan, 155 Cal. App.
2d 353, 318 P.2d 123.

4
A guests is defined as a person who rides in the
automobile of another without conferring benefit on him
other than the pleasure of his company. Hart v. Hogan,
173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99; Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.
2d 359, 317 P.2d 601; Cook v. Fariah, 73 Nev. 295, 318
P.2d 649; Parrish v. Ash, 32 Wash. 2d 637, 203 P.2d 330.
This Court in the case of Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah
2d 16, 376 P.2d 541 where both a social relationship
and a small monetary consideration was disclosed held
that a Jury question was created. It was for the Jury to
determine whether or not the person being transported
was a passenger or guest. The Court stated in its decision as follows :
"Where both payment and social incentive are
present and the evidence would support a finding
that each exerted a substantial influence on hauling the passenger the problem as to the relationship between the parties must be faced up to and
resolved by submitting the issues to the Jury."
p. 20.
The Smith case followed the earlier case of Jensen
v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 where the California case of Whitmore v. French was approved and
the following holding quoted:
"Where however the driver receives a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise which is a
motivating influence for furnishing the transportation the driver is liable for ordinary negligence."
(p. 344)
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The holdings of this Court are consistent with what
seems to be the modern trend and the great majority of
cases on the question of guest or passenger classification.
All the Courts seem to hold that the intention of the
driver in undertaking the transportation is a prime consideration. The teacher intends to obtain a benefit by
getting the student to school and this benefit is the real
motive for the invitation to ride.
It is respectfully submitted such relationship would
present a question of fact for the Jury to determine and
the Trial Court's ruling is therefore correct. See Smith
v. Franklin, Supra; Jensen v. Mower, Supra; Shapiro
v. Bookspan, 155 Cal. App. 2d 353, 318 P.2d 123; Parrish
v. Ash, 32 Wash. 2d 637, 203 P.2d 330; Nyberg v. Kirby,
65 Nev. 42, 188 P.2d 1006, 193 P.2d 850; Cook v. Fariah,
73 Nev. 295, 318 P.2d 649.

The case of Follansbee v. Bengenberg, 122 Cal. App.
2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 is quoted frequently for the statement that:
"A return which may make it worth the others
while to furnish a ride."
See also: Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal. 2d 359, 317 P.2d
GOl, and Spring v. Liles, ________ Ore. --------, 387 P.2d 578,
and Thuente v. Hart Motors, 234 Iowa 1294, 15 N.W. 2d
622.
It is respectfully submitted that the relationship of
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teacher and student in the same school might be found
by the Jury to be the motivating factor in the drivers
furnishing a ride to the minor child.
POINT II
A MINOR CHILD OF THE AGE OF 7 YEARS CANNOT
BE HELD TO BE A GUEST AS A MATTER OF LAW.

It has been held that a child of tender age lacks the
capacity to accept an invitation to ride. His capacity to
understand is recognized to be limited.
The Statutes of the State of Utah provide that a
child under the age of '7 years is incapable of committing
crimes. That a child between the ages of 7 years and 14
years is incapable of committing a crime in the absence
of clear proof that at the time of committing the act
charged against it, it knew its wrongfulness. U.C.A. 761-41.

The Guest Statute states:
"who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle."
Sec. 41-9-1 U.C.A.. 1953.
This language makes a question of fact as to whether
or not this minor child had the capacity to accept the ride.
The Utah Legislature did not intend minors to be responsible for their acts between the ages of 7 and 14 in the
absence of a clear proof that the minor understood the
nature of the undertaking engaged in.
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Defendant places great emphasis on the language
of the statute which states that a guest minor may not
recover. It is this plaintiff's position that the basic question is whether or not the minor is a guest. Where the
relationship of host and guest is a consentual relationship, did the child consent?
The basic question of fact is whether or not this child
could understand the nature of the guest-host relationship and whether or not she possessed the necessary
ability to accept a ride.
This matter has been considered by a number of
our neighboring states where the language requires, as
does Utah Statute, that the guest accept the ride. The
decisions are contrary to the position taken by defendant
Carter. The earliest and leading case on the position
of a minor child being carried without compensation from
the child and probably the leading case concerning this
subject is Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d
478. In this case a police officer was hauling a 5 year
old child who had been injured in an accident to the
hospital when the collision and injury to the child occurred. The California Supreme Court stated as follows
concerning the law and its concept of the child's position:
"(3) Section 141 3/4 supra, reads: 'Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle,
moving upon any of the public highways of the
State of California,' etc., shall not recover for any
injury. This section calls for some specific and
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voluntary action on the part of a person who becomes an occupant of the vehicle moving upon
the public highways of the state involved in the
accident, resulting in an injury to such occupant.
To be a guest one must have accepted the ride
in the vehicle involved. We think this imports both
a knowing and a voluntary acceptance, and does
not include either involuntary or a forced ride.
The word "accept" has a definite meaning.

In 1 C.J. p. 377, it is thus defined: ''To admit and

agree to; to accede to, or consent to; to receive
with approval; to adopt; to agree to. In the past
tense the word is commonly used to signify assent
and agreement.' The meaning of the word ''agreement" is thus set forth in 2 C.J. p. 979: 'In its
broad and comprehensive sense, demonstrated by
general usage, a coming or knitting together of
minds ; a coming together in opinion or determination; the coming together in accord, of two
minds, on a given proposition.* * * In law, a concord of understanding and intention, between two
or more parties, with respect to the effect upon
their relative rights and duties, of certain past
or future facts or performances ; the consent of
two or more persons concurring respecting the
transmission of some property, right or benefits,
with the view of contracting an obligation, a mutual obligation,' etc." P. 482
The case of Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216
P.2d 262, 16 A.L.R. 2d 1297 which have been annotated
at the cited A.L.R. volume is the case of a 5 year old
child being taken to the doctor by her mother in an
automobile being driven by an uncle. The accident oc-
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curred and the child was injured. The Oregon Supreme
Court following the Rocha v. Hulen case and other cases
to a like affect heldAhat the minor child could not be
a guest under these circumstances as a matter of law.
The Court reserved the question as to whether a child
of tender years could not under any circumstances be a
guest. The case stands for the proposition however that
the consent of the person transported to enter into the
relationship is necessary for a host-guest relationship to
exist.
In the case of Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31
N.E. 2d 670, a 6 year old child was left in the custody
of the defendant who took it for a ride without the
knowledge or consent of the child's parents and it was
ruled as a matter of law again that the child was not a
guest and that children under 7 years of age are conclusively presumed not to be able to consent and when
they are under this age as a matter of law they are not
guests and the question should not be left to the Jury.

Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 is the
earliest case plaintiff has discovered which discusses the
basic problem for this Court. This involved a 12 year old
child who was accompanying her mother, the nurse-companion of the driver of the automobile. The nurse-companion accompanied the driver for the driver's convenience. The child was in the automobile because her mother
had no place to leave her.
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The Washington Court viewed the matter in the
same general light as did the California Court and the
Oregon Court in the other cases cited and indicated that
a minor child under such circumstances has no real voluntary action. It accompanies the police officer to the
hospital without its consent. It accompanies its mother
to the doctor without being consulted and it accompanies
its mother on a trip without being asked. In the present
case, a child under Utah Law could not refuse to go to
school nor is it consulted about the way transportation
is arranged for it to that school. Certainly it has no
volition in the matter of obtaining transportation.
The latest case plaintiff has discovered which discusses this matter is the case of Green v. Jones, 136 Colo.
512, 319 P.2d 1083. A 2 year old child was involved.
The Colorado Court citing the criminal statutes of Colorado which are analogous to the Utah statutes cited in
this point held that a 2 year old child was incapable of
giving consent to the relationship of host and guest and
could not as a matter of law accept the ride. In this case
a babysitter took the child in her custody out in her car
and the child fell out of the car and was run over by one
of the wheels of the car.
One case cited by the defendant in her Brief is worthy of comment and that is the case of In re: TV rights
Esfote, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911. In this case Justice
Wertz authored the majority opinion as required by the
Court and then dissented from his own opinion writing
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a much more humane and common sense opinion in dissent than his majority opinion.
Many of the cases cited do involve both the social
relationship as well as affording some other consideration. Many of the cases are similar to the Smith v.
Franklin case supra where there was a social relationship and also other incentives and it is respectfully submitted that under such facts the Utah decision in Smith
v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P. 2d 541 that a jury
question is presented is the only reasonable and lawful
disposition.
In the light of the authorities cited and the Smith v.
Franklin, supra decision, it is respectfully submitted
that a question of fact to be determined by the Jury was
presented by the pre-trial discussion, the Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal and the facts in this case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should

affirm the judgment of the lower Court and order this
matter on for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ------------ day
of March, 1965.
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

